front 1 Whether one views the discretionary policies of the 1960s and 1970s
as destabilizing or believes the economy would have been less stable
without these policies, most economists agree that
- A) stabilization policies proved more difficult in practice
than many economists had expected.
- B) stabilization
policies proved not to be inflationary.
- C) the
nondiscretionary policymakers were right in believing that the
private economy is inherently stable.
- D) the discretionary
policymakers were right in believing that the private economy is
inherently stable.
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front 2 The argument that econometric policy evaluation is likely to be
misleading if policymakers assume stable economic relationships is
known as
- A) the monetarist revolution.
- B) the Lucas
critique.
- C) public choice theory.
- D) new Keynesian
theory.
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front 3 Lucas argues that when policies change, expectations will change thereby
- A) changing the relationships in econometric models.
- B) causing the government to abandon its discretionary
stance.
- C) forcing the Fed to keep its deliberations
secret.
- D) making it easier to predict the effects of policy
changes.
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front 4 The rational expectations hypothesis implies that when macroeconomic
policy changes
- A) the economy will become highly unstable.
- B) the
way expectations are formed will change.
- C) people will be
slow to catch on to the change.
- D) people will make
systematic mistakes.
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front 5 The Lucas critique indicates that
- A) advocates of discretionary policies' criticisms of rational
expectations models are well-founded.
- B) advocates of
discretionary policies' criticisms of rational expectations models
are not well-founded.
- C) expectations are important in
determining the outcome of a discretionary policy.
- D)
expectations are not important in determining the outcome of a
discretionary policy.
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front 6 The Lucas critique is an attack on the usefulness of
- A) conventional econometric models as forecasting tools.
- B) conventional econometric models as indicators of the
potential impacts on the economy of particular policies.
- C)
rational expectations models of macroeconomic activity.
- D)
the relationship between the quantity theory of money and aggregate
demand.
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front 7 The interest rate thought to have the most important impact on
aggregate demand is the
- A) short-term interest rate.
- B) T-bill rate.
- C) rate on 90-day CDs.
- D) long-term interest rate.
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front 8 A rise in short-term interest rates that is believed to be only temporary
- A) is likely to have a significant effect on long-term
interest rates.
- B) will have a bigger impact on long-term
interest rates than if the rise in short-term rates had been
permanent.
- C) is likely to have only a small impact on
long-term interest rates.
- D) cannot possibly affect
long-term interest rates.
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front 9 According to the Lucas critique, if past increases in the short-term
interest rate have always been temporary, then
- A) the term-structure relationship using past data will then
show only a weak effect of changes in the short-term interest rate
on the long-term rate.
- B) the term-structure relationship
using past data will show no effect of changes in the short-term
interest rate on the long-term rate.
- C) one cannot predict
the term-structure relationship as it depends on expectations.
- D) the term-structure relationship using past data will
nevertheless show a strong effect of changes in the short-term
interest rate on the long-term rate because of a change in the way
expectations are formed.
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front 10 A policy in which the money supply is kept growing at a constant rate
regardless of the state of the economy is
- A) a Taylor rule.
- B) a discretionary policy.
- C) a policy rule advocated by monetarists.
- D) advocated
by activists.
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front 11 Arguments for adopting a policy rule include
- A) the time-inconsistency problem can lead to poor economic
outcomes.
- B) discretionary policies pursue overly
expansionary monetary policies to boost employment in the short run
but generate higher inflation in the long run.
- C) policy
makers and politicians cannot be trusted.
- D) all of the
above.
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front 12 Arguments for adopting a policy rule include
- A) discretion avoids the straightjacket that would lock in the
wrong policy if the model that was used to derive the policy rule
proved to be incorrect.
- B) discretion enables policy makers
to change policy settings when an economy undergoes structural
changes.
- C) discretionary policies pursue overly expansionary
monetary policies to boost employment in the short run but generate
higher inflation in the long run.
- D) all of the above.
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front 13 Arguments for discretionary policies include
- A) policy rules can be too rigid because they cannot foresee
every contingency.
- B) the time-inconsistency problem can
lead to poor economic outcomes.
- C) discretionary policies
pursue overly expansionary monetary policies to boost employment in
the short run but generate higher inflation in the long run.
- D) all of the above.
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front 14 Arguments for discretionary policies include
- A) policy rules can be too rigid because they cannot foresee
every contingency.
- B) policy rules do not easily
incorporate the use of judgment.
- C) discretion avoids the
straightjacket that would lock in the wrong policy if the model that
was used to derive the policy rule proved to be incorrect.
- D) discretion enables policy makers to change policy settings
when an economy undergoes structural changes.
- E) all of the
above.
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front 15 ________ imposes a conceptual structure and inherent discipline on
policy makers, but without eliminating all flexibility.
- A) Constrained discretion
- B) A policy rule
- C) A discretionary policy
- D) The Taylor rule
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front 16 A credible nominal anchor
- A) can help overcome the time-inconsistency problem by
providing an expected constraint on discretionary policy.
- B) can help to anchor inflation expectations, which leads to
smaller fluctuations in inflation.
- C) is required for a
policy rule.
- D) all of the above.
- E) both A and
B.
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front 17 Suppose that there is a positive aggregate demand shock and the
central bank commits to an inflation rate target. If the commitment is
credible, then
- A) the public's expected inflation will remain unchanged.
- B) the short-run aggregate supply curve will not shift.
- C) over time inflation will fall back down to the inflation
target.
- D) all of the above.
- E) both A and B.
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front 18 Suppose that there is a positive aggregate demand shock and the
central bank commits to an inflation rate target. But if the
commitment is not credible, then
- A) the public's expected inflation will remain unchanged.
- B) the short-run aggregate supply curve will rise.
- C)
over time inflation will fall back down to the inflation
target.
- D) all of the above.
- E) both A and B.
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front 19 Suppose that there is a negative aggregate demand shock and the
central bank commits to an inflation rate target. If the commitment is
credible, then
- A) the public's expected inflation will remain unchanged.
- B) the short-run aggregate supply curve will rise.
- C)
over time inflation will fall.
- D) all of the above.
- E) both A and C.
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front 20 Suppose that there is a negative aggregate demand shock and the
central bank commits to an inflation rate target. But if the
commitment is not credible, then
- A) the public's expected inflation will remain unchanged.
- B) the short-run aggregate supply curve will rise.
- C)
economic contraction will be worse.
- D) all of the
above.
- E) both B and C.
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front 21 Suppose that there is a negative aggregate supply shock and the
central bank commits to an inflation rate target.
- A) If the commitment is credible, the public's expected
inflation will remain unchanged.
- B) Credible policy
produces better outcomes on both inflation and output in the short
run.
- C) Policies that are not credible produce worse economic
contraction.
- D) all of the above.
- E) both A and
C.
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front 22 The U.S. government can play an important role in establishing the
credibility of anti-inflation policy by
- A) demonstrating fiscal responsibility.
- B) monitoring
the Fed.
- C) conducting fiscal policy.
- D) all of
the above.
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front 23 Approaches to establishing central bank credibility include
- A) continued success at keeping inflation under control.
- B) central bank independence.
- C) appointment of a more
conservative central banker.
- D) all of the above.
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front 24 Approaches to establishing central bank credibility include
- A) continued success at keeping inflation under control.
- B) inflation targeting.
- C) exchange rate
targeting.
- D) all of the above.
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front 25 Approaches to establishing central bank credibility include
- A) inflation targeting.
- B) exchange rate
targeting.
- C) central bank independence.
- D)
appointment of a more conservative central banker.
- E) all
of the above.
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front 26 Approaches to establishing central bank credibility include
- A) inflation targeting.
- B) nominal GDP
targeting.
- C) central bank independence.
- D)
appointment of a more conservative central banker.
- E) all
of the above.
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front 27 Potential advantages of nominal GDP targeting include
- A) it implies that the central bank will respond to slowdowns
in the real economy even if inflation is not falling.
- B)
real GDP growth that is below potential or inflation that is below
the inflation objective will encourage more expansionary monetary
policy.
- C) it focuses not only on controlling inflation but
also explicitly on stabilizing real GDP.
- D) all of the
above.
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front 28 Potential weaknesses of nominal GDP targeting include
- A) it requires accurate estimates of potential GDP growth,
which are not easy to achieve.
- B) it implies that the
central bank will respond to slowdowns in the real economy even if
inflation is not falling.
- C) real GDP growth that is below
potential or inflation that is below the inflation objective will
encourage more expansionary monetary policy.
- D) it focuses
not only on controlling inflation but also explicitly on stabilizing
real GDP.
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front 29 Potential weaknesses of nominal GDP targeting include
- A) it is more complicated to explain to the public than
inflation targeting and thus the public might be confused about the
objectives of the central bank.
- B) it implies that the
central bank will respond to slowdowns in the real economy even if
inflation is not falling.
- C) real GDP growth that is below
potential or inflation that is below the inflation objective will
encourage more expansionary monetary policy.
- D) it focuses
not only on controlling inflation but also explicitly on stabilizing
real GDP.
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front 30 Potential weaknesses of nominal GDP targeting include
- A) it requires accurate estimates of potential GDP growth,
which are not easy to achieve.
- B) real GDP growth that is
below potential or inflation that is below the inflation objective
will encourage more expansionary monetary policy.
- C) it is
more complicated to explain to the public than inflation targeting
and thus the public might be confused about the objectives of the
central bank.
- D) both A and C.
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front 31 Ending the "Great Inflation" era in the 1970s is an example of
- A) inflation targeting.
- B) exchange rate
targeting.
- C) central bank independence.
- D)
appointment of a more conservative central banker.
- E) all
of the above.
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