front 1 What is the Evolutionary Function Account of disability? | back 1 A disability is some statistically atypical trait that (through most of our evolutionary history) substantially decreases likelihood of survival or reproduction. |
front 2 What worries does Barnes raise for the Evolutionary Function Account? | back 2 It over generates disabilities. Ex. Being gay; genetic predispositions for cancer |
front 3 What worries does Barnes raise for the Inability Account? | back 3 Over generates and under generates disabilities. |
front 4 What is the Discrimination Account of disability? | back 4 Disability is an impairment which harms or restricts you because of how society responds to that impairment. |
front 5 What worries does Barnes raise for the Discrimination Account? | back 5 Worry 1: Appealing to "impairment" is
circular/unhelpful |
front 6 What is Barnes's Conventionalist Account of disability? | back 6 Disability is something that the disability rights movement calls a
"disability" (circa 2022). |
front 7 What worries does Gregory raise for Barnes's Conventionalist Account? | back 7 Barnes's Account entails that the judgments of the 2022 disability
rights movement is infallible |
front 8 What is Gregory's Inability Account of disability? | back 8 Disability = a lack of ability |
front 9 Does Gregory's account allow for temporary disabilities? Does it allow for environment-dependent disabilities? | back 9 1. Disabilities can be temporary (viral infection) |
front 10 What worries might one raise for Gregory's account? (And how might Gregory reply to these worries?) | back 10 Counterexample (?) 1: Inability to whistle Counterexample (?) 2: Achondroplasia (dwarfism) + petite
woman Counterexample (?) 3: Joint Hypermobility Syndrome; Gregory's
response - ...?... Counterexample (?) 4: Inability to walk in a straight line
(drunk) |
front 11 What is McMahan's reply to the claim that selecting against disability is wrong because it's prejudiced? | back 11 Reply 1: Not selecting against disability does not make you not
prejudice |
front 12 What is McMahan's reply to the claim that selecting against disability is wrong because it harms existing people who are disabled, and deprives people of the insights those who are disabled bring? | back 12 Reply 1: If obj. 2 and 3 are good reasons to not select against
disability, then they are also good reasons to select for
disability |
front 13 What is McMahan's Aphrodisiac Argument for the conclusion that it's not wrong to select against disability? | back 13 Premise 1: If it is wrong to select against disability, then it is
permissible to select for disability |
front 14 What's the difference between the view that disabilities are negative difference makers and the view that disabilities are mere difference makers? | back 14 Negative Difference Makers: Disabilities inherently make one more
likely to have a lower overall quality of life |
front 15 What's the difference between overall quality of life and local quality of life? | back 15 Local quality of life (local harm): Certain
circumstances |
front 16 What is the Negative Difference Maker Argument? | back 16 Premise 1: Disabilities make life harder |
front 17 What is Barnes's reply to the Negative Difference Maker Argument? | back 17 Premise 2 is ambiguous; doesn't specify local or overall quality of
life: |
front 18 What is Barnes's reply to the worry that her account permits parents to let their children develop disabilities by not treating their illnesses? | back 18 Parents have the duty to prevent substantial or severe local harms to
their children |
front 19 What is Barnes's reply to the worry that her account suggests that parents may be obligated to select against homosexuality if society treats homosexuals poorly enough? | back 19 Barnes would say that protecting their life is more important than their sexuality |
front 20 What is Barnes's reply to the worry that her account suggests that parents may be obligated to select against disabilities that lead to substantial/severe harms? | back 20 Barnes believes parents only have duties to children who exist |
front 21 What's the Prejudice Objection to selecting against disability? | back 21 Selecting against disability expresses/is the result of prejudice
against people who are disabled. |
front 22 McMahan offers a reply to the Prejudice Objection. What response might one offer to McMahan? | back 22 Selecting against disability needn't be the result of
prejudice |
front 23 What's Malek's general reply to the Prejudice Objection? | back 23 Having a negative evaluation of a trait does not entail being prejudiced against people who have that trait |
front 24 How does the analogy between being disabled and being in pain support Malek's reply? | back 24 Negative evaluation of being in pain does not entail giving less
weight to the interests of people in pain, nor an unreasonable dislike
for people in pain. |
front 25 How does the analogy between being disabled and being homosexual potentially tell against Malek's reply? | back 25 Barnes's reply "A negative evaluation of being homosexual does
not entail giving less weight to the interests of homosexuals, nor an
unreasonable dislike for them". |
front 26 What is the Same Number Same Quality Principle (QP)? | back 26 All else being equal, in same number cases, you should pick the option that leads to the highest average well-being |
front 27 What is the Argument Against Well-Being Lowering (WBL)-Disability Selection? | back 27 Premise 1: QP |
front 28 What is the Argument Against Goat Selection? | back 28 Premise 1: QP |
front 29 What is the first dilemma Greene and Augello raise (regarding these two arguments)? | back 29 It is hard to accept the first argument without also accepting the second: GA reject QP (and reject both arguments) |
front 30 What is the Everworse Continuum Greene and Augello consider? | back 30 Through small incremental changes, a higher being could change a
"normal" human child into a goat. |
front 31 What is the second dilemma Greene and Augello raise (regarding the Everworse Continuum)? | back 31 Intuition #1: It is wrong to choose D over S |
front 32 What does Thomson take to be the implicit argument from "a fetus has a full right to life" to the conclusion "abortion is impermissible"? | back 32 Premise 1: A fetus has a full right to life to be violated if it is
aborted |
front 33 What is Thomson's criticism of the implicit argument? "a fetus has a full right to life" -> "abortion is impermissible" | back 33 P1 - Does not agree but initially grants that this is true |
front 34 What are some of Thomson's arguments by analogy for the claim that it's permissible for a woman to have an abortion if she'll die if she carries the fetus to term? | back 34 Ex. Expanding baby |
front 35 What is Thomson's arguments by analogy for the claim that it's permissible for a woman to have an abortion if she's pregnant due to rape? | back 35 Violinist Argument - Permissible |
front 36 What are some of Thomson's arguments by analogy for the claim that it's permissible for a woman to have an abortion if she's pregnant due to consensual sex? | back 36 Ex. Burglar |
front 37 What does consent have to be like to be morally relevant? | back 37 Assuming informed, competent, and uncoerced consent |
front 38 What are some different notions of consent (or "consent"), and what does each correspond to? | back 38 Explicit consent: To agree and to state your agreement |
front 39 What's the Consent Argument against abortion (in cases of pregnancy due to consensual sex)? (Feinberg) | back 39 Premise 1: If a woman has consensual sex, she consents to carry a
fetus to term if she becomes pregnant |
front 40 What worries one might raise for the Consent Argument? | back 40 Premise 1 is false in explicit and implicit consent |
front 41 What's the Negligence Argument against abortion (in cases of pregnancy due to consensual sex)? | back 41 Premise 1: If you have consensual sex and get pregnant, you are
(partially) causally responsible for the fetus being dependent on
you |
front 42 According to Feinberg, what kinds of situations make you morally responsible enough to be obligated to carry a fetus to term? | back 42 Having sex with no contraception makes you completely responsible, and having a baby despite using contraception makes you partially responsible |
front 43 What worries does Boonin raise for the Negligence Argument? | back 43 P1 of the negligence argument is ok but premise 2 is false |
front 44 What is the argument for child support? | back 44 Premise 1: Parents are obligated to make reasonable sacrifices for
the well-being of their (rights-having) offspring (larger) |
front 45 What is the argument for fetus support? | back 45 Premise 1*: Parents are obligated to make reasonable sacrifices for
the well-being of their (rights-having) offspring (larger) |
front 46 What are the different options for responding to the argument for the fetus support? (And what are some of the pros and cons of each?) | back 46 Option 1 (Feinberg): Accept all premises except P2* |